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PREVIEW; Park Cty. Envtl. Council and Greater Yellowstone
Coal. v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality and Lucky Minerals,
Inc.: MEPA and Review of Agency Decisions
Lacey Fortin
The Montana Supreme Court was originally set to hear oral
argument on this matter on Thursday, April 30, 2020. However,
due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the Court cancelled oral
arguments and will decide the matter based on the parties’ briefs.
I.

INTRODUCTION

This case presents the following issues: 1) whether the
plaintiffs-appellees have standing to challenge the Montana
Department of Environmental Quality’s (DEQ) decision to issue
Lucky Minerals an exploration license; 2) whether the DEQ
violated the Montana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) by failing
to take the required “hard look” at the environmental impacts of
Lucky Minerals’ proposed mining exploration; and 3) whether
Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d) (2019) violates plaintiffappellees’ constitutional rights to meaningful participation in
agency decision-making and to a clean and healthful environment.
II.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In February 2015, Lucky Minerals, Inc. (Lucky Minerals)
filed an application to conduct mining exploration on its property
in the Emigrant Gulch Mining District of the Absaroka Mountains.
The DEQ prepared a draft environmental assessment (EA), which
was submitted for public review and a 60-day comment period
beginning on October 12, 2016.1 The DEQ ultimately approved
Lucky Minerals’ application, adopting an agency modified
alternative which imposed some additional mitigation measures.2
After issuance of the exploration license to Lucky
Minerals, Park County Environmental Council and Greater
Yellowstone Coalition (PCEC) filed a lawsuit in Park County
District Court challenging the DEQ’s decision to grant the license.3

Appellant’s (State of Montana) Opening Brief at 5, Park Cty. Envtl.
Council v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/9HLH-DHVN
(November 29, 2019) (No. 19-0492).
2
Id.
3
Appellant’s (Lucky Minerals) Opening Brief at 6, Park Cty. Envtl. Council
v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/S2E9-B2J4 (November 29,
2019) (No. 19-0492).
1
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PCEC also moved to vacate Lucky Minerals’ exploration license.4
The district court ruled that the DEQ violated MEPA by failing to
take the required “hard look” at the environmental impacts of
Lucky Minerals’ proposed plan, including the impacts on wildlife
and water quality.5 The district court also granted PCEC’s motion
to vacate the exploration license, holding the remedial measure
limitations in Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d) violated the
plaintiffs’ constitutional rights to participation in agency decisionmaking and to a clean and healthful environment.6
Lucky Minerals and DEQ have appealed the district court’s
rulings. The Office of the Attorney general has intervened on
behalf of the State of Montana.
III.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Appellants’ (DEQ, Lucky Minerals, and State of Montana)
Arguments

A.

Lucky Minerals argues that PCEC does not have standing
in this matter. Both Lucky Minerals and the DEQ argue that the
district court erred in ruling that the DEQ’s environmental analysis
was inadequate under MEPA. Lucky Minerals and the State of
Montana also argue that the district court erroneously concluded
that the statute requiring remand to the DEQ was unconstitutional.
First, Lucky Minerals contends that PCEC failed to meet
the requirements for standing to challenge the issuance of their
exploration license. Because MEPA is barren of a provision
conferring an express right of judicial review to private litigants,
standing in MEPA actions is based upon prudential standards.7
Therefore, a plaintiffs’ standing to bring this action requires the
following: 1) a clear threat to a past, present or threatened injury to
a property or civil right; 2) the alleged injury must be an actual
“case or controversy”;8 and 3) the injury must be “concrete.”9
Lucky Minerals argues that PCEC’s “vague allegations of
non-specific injuries to biking, hiking, and skiing up Emigrant

4

Id. at 7–8.
Appellant’s (DEQ) Opening Brief at 13–14, Park Cty. Envtl. Council v.
Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/C9KS-6ED5 (November 27,
2019) (No. 19-0492).
6
Appellant’s (DEQ) Opening Brief, supra note 5, at 8.
7
Id. at 19.
8
Schoof v. Nesbit, 316 P.3d 831, 835 (Mont. 2014).
9
Schoof, 316 P.3d at 836.
5
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Gulch” are insufficient to satisfy those requirements.10 In fact, they
state that PCEC’s claimed standing is simply based on
“speculation that legal injury could potentially be visited upon
[them] at some unspecified point in the future as a result of [largescale] industrial mining activity.”11 As such, Lucky Minerals
argues that PCEC’s complaint in the case below should have been
dismissed for lack of standing.
Second, the DEQ contends it took the required “hard look”
at Lucky Minerals’ proposed plan. In doing so, they state they
satisfied their obligation to “make an adequate compilation of
relevant information, to analyze it reasonable, and to consider all
pertinent data.”12 The DEQ disagrees with the district court’s
finding that they “cherry picked”, or arbitrarily disregarded,
pertinent water quality,13 and argues they were not required to
consider the potential effects of a full-scale mining operation as a
secondary impact of Lucky Minerals’ proposed plan.14
Furthermore, because their final EA took a sufficiently “hard look”
at the relevant data, they maintain no formal environmental impact
(EIS) was required.
Finally, the State of Montana argues that Mont. Code Ann.
§ 75-1-201(6)(c) and (d) are constitutional, both facially and as
applied to the facts of this case. The State of Montana notes that
MEPA merely constitutes procedural guidelines designed to
complement substantive regulatory environmental law in
Montana.15 In contrast to regulatory laws, MEPA is “intended to
inform the legislature and the public whether these substantive
environmental protection laws are sufficient [to protect Montana’s
environment].”16
The State contends the district court erroneously
determined MEPA itself should provide remedies to protect the
environment.17 This, they maintain, is antithetical to the Court’s
previously “restrained and targeted approach” of reviewing
substantive environmental laws in isolation from MEPA.18
Because PCEC only alleged injuries under MEPA—which does
Appellant’s (Lucky Minerals) Opening Brief, supra note 3, at 22.
Id. at 18.
12
Appellant’s (DEQ) Opening Brief, supra note 5, at 12.
13
Id. at 22.
14
Id. at 34 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 82-4-335(1) (2019) requiring Lucky
Minerals to get additional approval to conduct any future mining).
15
Appellant’s (State of Montana) Opening Brief, supra note 1, at 16.
16
Id. at 17 (citing MONT. CODE ANN. § 75-1-102(1) (2019)).
17
Id. at 23.
18
Id. at 25.
10
11
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not provide injunctive relief—and PCEC also failed to allege
injury under any substantive law, Lucky Minerals contends they
are not entitled to relief.
The State also asserts the district court’s ruling that the
DEQ should have considered the potential impacts of an expansion
into a full-scale mining operation violated the tiered decisionmaking system of the Metal Mining Reclamation Act (MMRA).
The State notes the MMRA would require Lucky Minerals to file a
separate application before conducting full-scale mining. The State
thus inherently argues the MMRA was the substantive regulatory
law on which the district court should have relied in making its
decision.
B.

Appellees’ (PCEC) Arguments

Appellees argue that the district court’s decision should be
affirmed in all respects. Specifically, they contend the district court
was correct in determining they had standing to challenge the grant
to Lucky Minerals of a mining exploration license, and that the
DEQ arbitrarily failed to consider pertinent data on potential
adverse environmental impacts. As such, PCEC contends the
DEQ’s Final EA was flawed, and should have resulted in a finding
of significant environmental impacts and called for an EIS. Finally,
PCEC argues the remedial measure restrictions in Mont. Code
Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d) fail to satisfy strict scrutiny and are
therefore unconstitutional both facially and as applied here.
PCEC contends they have standing to challenge the DEQ’s
approval of Lucky Mineral’s mining exploration license.
Consistent with precedent, the individual plaintiffs filed affidavits
in the district court alleging “injuries sufficient to confer standing
by documenting harm to their business, property, recreational or
aesthetic interests if the exploration project proceeds.”19 PCEC
argues their injuries are sufficient to establish standing because, as
nearby landowners and frequent recreationists in the Emigrant
Gulch area, the proposed exploration project will be more harmful
to them than the public generally.20
PCEC also argues the DEQ violated MEPA by failing to
take the requisite “hard look” at the pertinent information in its
environmental assessment of Lucky Minerals’ proposed mining
19
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ (PCEC) Response Brief at 14, Park Cty. Envtl.
Council v. Montana Dep’t of Envtl. Quality, https://perma.cc/HE62-RNCH
(January 27, 2020) (No. 19-0492).
20
Id. at 16.
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exploration project. Specifically, PCEC contends the DEQ’s final
EA was insufficient because it arbitrarily dismissed potential harm
to wildlife and water quality, and it failed to properly evaluate
feasible project alternatives that contemplated a reduced scale of
Lucky Minerals’ exploration project.21 As a result, PCEC asserts
that the DEQ erroneously determined no EIS was required and
therefore improperly issued Lucky Minerals the exploration
license.
Specifically, PCEC contends information gaps, selective
reliance on data, and a vague “plan to make a plan” to mitigate
potential adverse environmental impacts constitute an arbitrary
analysis.22 In PCEC’s view, these failings resulted in an analysis
that should have found significant environmental impacts, which
would have required an EIS pursuant to Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1201(1)(b)(iv) and Mont. Admin. R. 17.4.607.23 Additionally,
PCEC asserts the DEQ violated MEPA by “failing to conduct an
independent analysis” of alternative methods of meeting Lucky
Minerals’ project goals and by failing to seriously consider how to
reduce potential adverse environmental impacts.24
Finally, PCEC argues the 2011 Legislature’s “prohibition
against district courts’ vacating or enjoining of unlawful state
agency decisions violates the public’s fundamental rights to be free
from unreasonable environmental degradation, Mont Const. art. II,
§ 3; art. IX, § 1, and participate in agency decision-making before
final decisions are made, Mont. Const. art. II, § 8.”25 In other
words, PCEC contends the restrictions on remedial measures
provided in the statute infringe on their constitutional rights to a
clean and healthful environment and to participate in agency
decision-making.
They argue that, because these provisions infringe on
fundamental rights, they must satisfy strict scrutiny by being
narrowly tailored to a compelling state interest.26 PCEC’s position
is that, with respect to Lucky Minerals’ exploration permit, Mont.
Code Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d) are not narrowly tailored to a
compelling state interest, and therefore do not pass strict scrutiny.

21

Id. at 17–22.
Id. at 27–28.
23
Id. at 28.
24
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ (PCEC) Response Brief, supra note 20, at 32 (citing
Southern Utah Wilderness Alliance v. Norton, 237 F.Supp.2d 48, 53 (D.C.,
2002), applying National Environmental Policy Act).
25
Id. at 37.
26
Id. at 51.
22
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Thus, they assert the Supreme Court should affirm the district
court’s ruling that the provision is unconstitutional.
IV.

ANALYSIS

The Court will likely affirm the district court’s order that
plaintiffs-appellees have standing to challenge Lucky Minerals’
exploration license based on alleged past, present, or threatened
injury to property and business interests, as well as infringement
on their constitutional rights.27 The individual plaintiffs include
property owners, business owners, and frequent recreationists in
the area.28 The Court has, in other instances, affirmed plaintiffs’
standing to challenge activities based on potential impacts to
wildlife, noise and traffic, and property values.29 It is therefore
likely the Court will agree with the district court that plaintiffs’
alleged injuries to property values, business operations, and
recreational interests based on disturbance of wildlife, threats to
water quality, and increased traffic and noise are sufficient to
establish a “past, present, or threatened injury” to property rights
that are “distinguishable from . . . injury to the public generally.”30
If the Court finds the plaintiffs-appellees have standing to
challenge the DEQ’s decision to issue Lucky Minerals’ exploration
license, it is likely to find the procedural limitations under Mont.
Code Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d) do not infringe on the
constitutional right to participate in agency decision-making.
The Montana Constitution guarantees citizens the right to
“expect governmental agencies to afford such reasonable
opportunity for citizen participation in the operation of the
agencies prior to the final decision.”31 Here, the DEQ provided
notice and opportunity to participate by submitting the proposal for
public review and comment pursuant to this requirement.32 It
appears the plaintiffs-appellees participated enthusiastically in this
process.

27

Id. at 14 (citing Aspen Trails Ranch, LLC v. Simmons, 230 P.3d 808
(Mont. 2010) (subsequent citations omitted)).
28
Id.
29
Plaintiffs-Appellees’ (PCEC) Response Brief, supra note 19, at 14 (citing
Aspen Trails Ranch, 230 P.3d 808; Heffernan v. Missoula City Council, 255
P.3d 80 (Mont. 2011)).
30
Id. at 12–13 (citing Heffernan, 255 P.3d at 92).
31
MONT. CONST. art. II, § 8.
32
Appellant’s (DEQ) Opening Brief, supra note 5, at 8.
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However, regardless of whether PCEC actually participated
in the DEQ’s original decision-making process, a claim for
infringement of their right to participate is essentially rendered
moot upon a court remanding the decision for reconsideration.
Furthermore, any future violation by the agency of the plaintiffsappellees’ right to participate in the new decision-making process
would be directly actionable under MEPA. In short, it seems
improbable the Court would find the procedural limitations of the
statute, alone, create an actionable injury to the constitutional right
to participate.
Finally, the Court will likely find that the district court
erroneously determined the DEQ’s environmental analysis was
insufficient and improperly voided Lucky Minerals’ exploration
license in violation of the procedural limitations of Mont. Code
Ann. § 75-1-201(6)(c)–(d). As defendant-appellants Lucky
Minerals point out, courts review agency actions under MEPA to
determine whether the agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or
unlawfully.33 When courts review an executive agency’s
interpretation of its own governing laws or regulations, substantial
deference is paid to the agency’s decisions rendered pursuant to its
own expertise “unless such interpretation is plainly inconsistent
with the spirit of the regulation.”34 The Court will afford the DEQ
the appropriate level of deference here. In doing so, it is likely to
find the environmental analysis was sufficient to warrant the
issuance of an exploration license to Lucky Minerals.
V.

CONCLUSION

It is likely that the Court will affirm the district court’s
order that PCEC has standing to challenge Lucky Minerals’ mining
exploration permit based on concrete and personal alleged injuries.
In doing so, the Court will likely find Mont. Code Ann. § 75-1201(6)(c)–(d) do not unconstitutionally infringe on the right to
participate in agency decision-making, and instead merely serve as
a procedural complement to substantive regulatory laws.
Furthermore, the Court will afford the DEQ deference on its
environmental assessment and hold the analysis of potential
environmental impacts was sufficient. As a result, the Court will
likely reverse the district court’s order voiding Lucky Minerals’
exploration license.
33
Ravalli County Fish and Game Ass’n, Inc. v. Mont. Dept. of State Lands,
903 P.2d 1362, 1366 (Mont. 1995) (internal citation omitted).
34
Clark Fork Coalition v. Montana Dept. of Environmental Quality, 197
P.3d 482, 488 (Mont. 2008).

